Time and objects

What this passage does

Two challenges follow. If tendencies end (4.11), do things simply vanish? No: past and future exist in their own form, things move between time-paths (4.12), and all are made of guṇas (4.13). Then, is the world only mind? The sūtras argue that objects are single, real, shared by many minds and independent of any one (4.14–4.17). Vyāsa aims this at unnamed idealists; Vācaspati names them as Buddhist.

Learning goals

• Explain how past and future 'exist in their own form' (4.12), and why this answers the worry left by 4.11.
• Lay out the four steps of the argument that objects are real and independent of any one mind (4.14–4.17).
• Say who the opponents are on Vyāsa's and Vācaspati's accounts, and that the debate had another side.

The argument, step by step

1. Past and future exist in their own form; the qualities of things differ only in which time-path they are on.
2. Whatever is on those paths, manifest or subtle, is made of the guṇas.
3. Because the transformation is one, a thing is a single reality.
4. The object is the same while minds differ, so object and mind follow separate paths.
5. An object does not depend on a single mind, or what would it be when that mind was not perceiving it?
6. An object is known or unknown depending on whether it colours the mind.

The sūtras

1. 4.12 atītānāgataṃ svarūpato 'sty adhvabhedād dharmāṇām
   Past and future exist in their own form, since the qualities of things differ only in which time-path they are on.
2. 4.13 te vyaktasūkṣmā guṇātmānaḥ
   They are manifest or subtle, and made of the guṇas.
3. 4.14 pariṇāmaikatvād vastutattvam
   Because the transformation is one, a thing is a single reality.
4. 4.15 vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ
   The object is the same but minds differ, so object and mind follow separate paths.
5. 4.16 na caikacittatantraṃ vastu tadapramāṇakaṃ tadā kiṃ syāt
   Nor does an object depend on a single mind; if it did, what would it be when that mind was not perceiving it?
6. 4.17 taduparāgāpekṣitvāc cittasya vastu jñātājñātam
   An object is known or unknown depending on whether it colours the mind.

Study

Two challenges follow from 4.11. If tendencies cease, do they simply vanish? And if experience is shaped by tendencies, is the world only mind? This passage answers both.

To the first: 'Past and future exist in their own form, since the qualities of things differ only in which time-path they are on' (4.12). Vyāsa defines the three: the future is what has yet to become manifest, the past is what has already been experienced as manifest, and the present is what has taken up its own activity (Woods p. 315). Tendencies that cease change time-path. This is the view 3.13–3.14 prepared, and Vyāsa adds that without it the knowledge of past and future would have no object (compare 3.16). 4.13 says that whatever is on these paths, manifest or subtle, is made of the guṇas. Vyāsa quotes a verse: the guṇas' deepest form never comes into view, and what does come into view is like a magic show, quite empty (p. 317). Vācaspati softens it: like a phantom, but not quite a phantom.

To the second, the passage gives a four-step argument for real objects. If all is guṇas, how is anything one thing? 'Because the transformation is one, a thing is a single reality' (4.14). Vyāsa then turns on unnamed opponents who say there is no object apart from cognition, as in dreams, and asks how their words can be trusted while they explain away what is in front of them (p. 319). Next, 'the object is the same but minds differ, so object and mind follow separate paths' (4.15). The same thing brings pleasure to one mind and pain to another, so whose mind would have conjured it up (p. 323)? Then 4.16: an object does not depend on one mind, for what would it be when that mind was not perceiving it? Vyāsa adds that we never see the back of a thing while seeing its front, yet if the back did not exist, neither could the front be known (p. 325). Last, 4.17 explains how objects are known: by colouring the mind, as a magnet draws iron (p. 327). Vyāsa draws a consequence that opens the next passage: because its objects are now known and now unknown, the mind changes.

Who are the opponents? Vyāsa does not name them. Vācaspati identifies them as Buddhist idealists (Vijñānavāda). This is one side of a long Indian debate, and the Buddhist idealist schools answered with arguments of their own, including on the shared-world point of 4.15–4.16. A teacher should present it as a debate.

For practice, the point is that Yoga's path depends on two realities kept distinct: a world that is really there, and a seer that is not the mind. If the world were only mind, there would be nothing to tell the self apart from,. The everyday lesson of 4.15 is also worth keeping: our reaction to a thing tells us about our own mind as much as about the thing.

For discussion

1. How does 4.12 answer the worry that ending tendencies would destroy something real?
2. Restate the argument of 4.15 in your own words. Do you find it convincing?
3. What does Vyāsa's point about the back and front of a thing (4.16) show?
4. Why does the Yoga path need objects to be real? What would discernment have to do if they were not?

A common misreading

That Yoga teaches the world is an illusion. 4.14–4.16 argue the opposite: objects are real, shared and independent of any one mind. The 'magic show' verse in 4.13 is about how the guṇas appear, and Vācaspati takes it as 'like a phantom, but not quite a phantom'.

A practice for the room

Place one ordinary object where everyone can see it, a stone or a cup. One minute: all look at it in silence. Then invite three or four people to say one word for what it brings to mind. Notice how different the words are, while the object has not changed (4.15). Then two minutes with eyes closed, recalling that it is still there though no one is looking (4.16). Close with one minute looking at it again.