4.16 · The Unwatched Jar

Nor does an object depend on a single mind; if it did, what would it be when that mind was not perceiving it?

Word by word

na

not

ca

and

eka-citta-tantram

dependent on one mind

vastu

object

tat-apramāṇakam

not perceived by it

tadā

then

kim

what

syāt

would it be

Where it fits

Vyāsa sets up a further opponent: some say an object exists only together with its cognition. Then what would it be when no one perceived it? Vyāsa concludes that an object is independent and common to all selves, while each self has its own mind (compare 2.22). 4.17 explains how such objects become known.

Reading

The first step of the argument continues: objects are real in their own right. If an object existed only while one mind perceived it, what would it be when that mind looked away? Vyāsa makes an everyday point: we never see the back of a thing while looking at its front, yet if the unseen back did not exist, neither could the front be known. Things are common to all, and stand apart from any one mind.

Vyāsa

“If a thing depended on a single mind, then when that mind was distracted or stilled, the thing itself would be untouched by it. It would be no one else's object, known by no means of knowledge, its nature grasped by nobody. What would it be then?”

Vyāsa's Yoga-bhāṣya, the oldest commentary. New translation from the Sanskrit, with reference to Woods (1914), p. 325.

Practice

Leave the room you are in for one minute. Before you go back, picture what is there: the chair, the light on the floor, the cup. Return and check. It all carried on without you.

A question to sit with

What goes on being real when you are not looking?

Where commentators disagree

Is 4.16 one of Patañjali's sūtras at all?

Vācaspati Miśra

Treats it as a sūtra and comments on it as the answer to those who say an object exists only while it is known. He notes that Vyāsa first rebuts that view 'independently of the sūtra', and then the sūtra replies. (Woods 1914, pp. 325–326)

Rāmānanda Sarasvatī

Also reads it as a sūtra and explains it: a water-jar cannot be the product of one mind, or it would be destroyed when that mind turned to a cloth, yet it is recognised again and seen by others. (Woods 1915, JAOS 34, p. 100)

Bhoja

Has no such sūtra. His fourth book goes straight from our 4.15 to 'An object is known or unknown…' (our 4.17) and ends with 33 sūtras, not 34. Jha notes that Bhoja leaves it out. (Tatya 1885, pp. 152–155, 171; Mitra 1883, wisdomlib on 4.15–4.16; Jha 1907, p. 148)

Key ideas

prakṛti (nature, the seen), citta (the mind-field), puruṣa (the seer, the self)